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COMMENT
THE VALIDITY OF THE SEGREGATION OF THE
SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH UNDER THE LAW
It would be of interest to the legal profession that the term
"psychopathic personality" is no longer regarded by psychiatry
as meaningful, yet it will probably remain embalmed for some
time to come in the statutes of several States where the pursuit
of demons disguised as sexual psychopaths affords a glimpse of
a 16th Century approach to mental illness.'
INTRODUCTION
In the years 1938-39 Illinois, California, Michigan and Minne-
sota adopted "sexual psychopath" laws as a means of dealing with
sex offenders.2 Presently some thirty states and the District of Co-
lumbia have some form of sexual psychopath statute, making
possible the indefinite commitment of a sex offender.8 This comment
will describe the procedures used by the various states under these
statutes, analyze the purposes of the statutes, and measure their
effect against those purposes. Finally the question of whether there
is any valid reason for the classification and special treatment of
sexual psychopaths under the law over and above the ordinary
criminal sanctions and civil commitment procedures will be dis-
cussed. It will be assumed that the sexual conduct used as a basis
for application of the sexual psychopath statutes is subject to
criminal sanction.
CRIMINAL SAcnoNs FOR SEXUAL ACTS
In evaluating the sexual psychopath statutes, it must be re-
membered that the statutes operate in legal systems which provide
criminal sanctions for certain sexual conduct independent of the
sexual psychopath statutes. Examination of these criminal sanctions
I Roche, The Criminal Mind 25 (1958).
2 Levy, "Interaction of Institutions and Policy Groups: The Origin of Sex
Crime Legislation," 5 Law. & L. Notes 3 n.1 (1951).
3 Bowman & Engle, "Sexual Psychopath Laws," in Sexual Behavior and the Law
757, 774 n.2 (Slovenko ed. 1965). The states are: Alabama, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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reveals wide variation in approach by the individual states.4 For
example, an act of sodomy, performed in private between consenting
adults is not a crime in Illinois5 but renders the participant liable to
a sentence up to life imprisonment in Nevada.6 Ohio7 and Pennsyl-
vania" forbid placing an individual convicted of sodomy on proba-
tion. Conviction of a second offense of this nature may result in a
substantially longer sentence in some states, perhaps even life
imprisonment.9
In spite of the wide variation between states, a few general
principles do emerge. The sanctions imposed are heavy, usually
involving either long prison terms or fines or both. An even stronger
sanction is imposed where the element of force is present or where
the victim is a child.10
THE DEFINITION OF THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
The first problem which must be faced in evaluating the sexual
psychopath laws is to determine which individuals shall be subject
to their provisions. Here again the approaches of the individual
states vary. One group of states defines the sexual psychopath in
terms of a repeated course of conduct which, if continued, would
constitute a danger to others. Typical of this group is the statute
of the District of Columbia:
"Sexual psychopath" means a person, not insane who by a
course of repeated misconduct in sexual matters has evidenced
such lack of power to control his sexual impulses as to be danger-
ous to other persons because he is likely to attack or otherwise
inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of his desire."1
4 See generally Mueller, Legal Regulation of Sexual Conduct (1961).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 11-2 to 11-6 (1964). The Illinois criminal statutes
have recently been changed, and the use of force, lack of age of a participant, or
performance in public have become essential elements for the conduct to be con-
sidered criminal.
6 Nev. Rev. Stat § 201.190 (Supp. 1963).
7 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.04 (Page 1953).
8 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 1081 (1964).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Pen. Law § 1940 (life indeterminate); Ore Rev. Stat. § 167.050
(1957) (life indeterminate).
10 See Mueller, op. cit. supra note 4, at 65-158; see also Bensing, "A Compar-
ative Study of American Sex Statutes," 42 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 57 (1951).
11 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3503 (1961). Other states which have adopted this
pattern of definition are Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 123A, § 1 (1965)
(sexually dangerous person); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2901 (1956) (sexual
psycopath) ; New Jersey, N.J. Rev. Stat. 2A:164-5 (Supp. 1964) (sex offender);
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A second group of states requires the existence of some mental dis-
order (often excluding a disorder of such severity as to remove
criminal responsibility) coupled with "criminal propensities" or "a
predisposition" toward the commission of sex offenses. Some of these
states specifically require that the person be a danger to the health
or safety of others, while other states are silent on this matter. An
Iowa statute provides:
All persons charged with a public offense, who are suffering from
a mental disorder and are not a proper subject for the schools for
the mentally retarded or for commitment as a mentally ill person,
having criminal propensities toward the commission of sex
offenses, and who ay be considered dangerous to others, are
hereby declared to be "criminal sexual psychopaths."' 2
While an Alabama law states:
Any person who is suffering from a mental disorder but is not
mentally ill or feeble-minded to an extent making him criminally
irresponsible for his acts, such mental disorder having existed for
a period of not less than one year and being coupled with criminal
propensities to the commission of sex offenses is hereby declared
to be a criminal sexual psychopathic person within the meaning
of this article.' 3
There appears to be no difference in definition when the phrase
requiring the individual to be a danger to others is omitted. The
courts apparently assume that the existence of the psychopathic
condition coupled with "criminal propensities" automatically makes
the individual a menace to the public.14
The remaining states require conviction for a felony or a sex
crime before invoking the statute, and define the sex psychopath
in vague terms of "danger to others." Ohio, however, defines the
psychopathic offender as:
any person who is adjudged to have a psychopathic personality,
who exhibits criminal tendencies and who by reason thereof is a
Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 2816 (1958) (psychopathic personality) ; Wyoming,
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-351 (Supp. 1963). For a discussion of the problems inherent in
this type of definition see Comment "Sexual Psychopathy-A legal Labyrinth of
Medicine, Morals, Mythology," 36 Neb. L. Rev. 320 (1957).
12 Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.1 (Supp. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
13 Ala. Code tit. 15, § 434 (1958). Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3401 (1956) (criminal
sexual psychopathic person) and Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.967(1) (1954) (criminal
sexual psychopathic person) are also silent on the element of danger to the public
safety or welfare.
14 See, e.g., State v. Criminal Court, 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E2d 128 (1955) ; In re
Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W2d 470 (1958).
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menace to the public. Psychopathic personality is evidenced by
such traits or characteristics inconsistent with the age of such
person, as emotional immaturity and instability, impulsive, irre-
sponsible, reckless, and unruly acts, excessively self-centered
attitudes, deficient powers of self-discipline, lack of normal
capacity to learn from experience, marked deficiency of moral
sense or control.15
The intrinsic breadth of this definition is obvious, and whether it
is any more helpful than the "danger to others" statutes in identi-
fying the individuals to be covered, is open to question.
Further examination of these statutes clearly reveals that they
fail in their purpose of defining the individuals subject to their
procedure. Such phrases as "repeated misconduct," "danger to
others," and "criminal propensities" are subject to many possible
interpretations. For example, how many acts are required to consti-
tute repeated misconduct? Does the possibility that an individual
will expose himself in public make him a danger to others? One
critic of the sex-psychopath statutes has pointed out:
The basic task of the sex-psychopath laws is to differentiate
dangerous sex offenders from minor criminals who commit sex
crimes and who should be handled by the ordinary procedures
of the criminal law .... The sex-psychopath laws fail miserably
in this vital task.1
The Supreme Court has said that such statutes withstand
claims of unconstitutional vagueness, that they call for proof of con-
duct which proof accords due process and equal protection, that the
class is identified and is dangerous to the community, and that the
legislatures may so declare.'7
Presumably one of the reasons for the use of such terms as
sexual psychopathy is the desire to utilize the expertise of those
members of the medical profession who specialize in the study of
mental disorders. Yet psychiatrists cannot agree among themselves
on a meaning for these terms,'8 and generally seem to concede that
15 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 294724(B) (Page 1953). Compare Washington,
which in addition to defining sexual psychopath [Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.06.010
(1962)], defines psychopathic personality as: "the existence in any person of such
hereditary, congenital or acquired conditions affecting the emotional or volitional
rather than the intellectual field and manifested by anomalies of such character as
to render satisfactory social adjustment of such person difficult or impossible."
10 Ploscowe, Sex and the Law 227 (1951).
17 Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1939). Accord, Commonwealth v.
Ackers, 175 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1961) ; Annot., 24 A.L.R2d 350, 363-64 (1952).
IS See, e.g., Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 305-06
(1961) ; Representation and Recommendation of the N.J. Comm'n on the Habitual
Sex Offender 40-42, 57-58 (1950).
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they "have no legitimate place in psychiatric nosology or dynamic
classification," "The term subsumes a long, broadly descriptive
list of personality traits and is not a specific diagnostic label based
on scientific data." 20 Thus such general terms as sexual psychopath
provide little or no help to the psychiatrist in determining which
individuals fit the statutory definitions.
Examination of the more specific statutory criteria may well
afford little assistance to the psychiatrist. For example, Dr. Karp-
man examines the District of Columbia definition21 of sexual psycho-
path and complains:
What sort of person, it may be asked, is it who is not to be
regarded as insane yet whose repeated misconduct in sexual
matters reveals an utter lack of power to control his impulses,
an irresistible desire to attack other people without regard for
social or personal considerations? Who does not know the para-
noid schizophrenic who attacks innocent people and for this
reason becomes dangerous to the community? Where is the
difference between the sexual psychopath who impulsively attacks
an unknown person, and the schizophrenic who does the same
thing? 22
There is good reason to believe that the classification under
these statutes is a legal one, using-perhaps unfortunately-medical
nomenclature. But since not only terminology, but experts as well,
are borrowed from the medical profession, the view persists that
sex deviates ought to fit comfortably and precisely into a psychiatric
classification. From a psychiatric view point it is no more valid
to group sex offenders in one category than it is to "group biological
disorders together simply because they share one symptom." " The
sexual misconduct may be a symptom of some underlying mental
disorder such as schizophrenia, psychosis, or neurosis rather than a
form of mental illness in and of itself.24
Professor Tappan cogently sums up the problems faced by the
psychiatrist in dealing with the definition problem. After listing the
notion that sex psychopathy or sex deviation is a clinical entity as
one of the several myths surrounding the sex offender, he states:
19 Karpman, The Sexual Offender and His Offenses 478 (1954).
20 Bowman & Engle, supra note 3, at 766. The term may, however, have some
validity for administrative purposes. See Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law
50-51 (1953) ; see also Roche, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25.
21 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
22 Karpman, op. cit. supra note 19, at 488.
23 Slovenko & Phillips, "Psychosexuality and the Criminal Law," 15 Vand. L.
Rev. 797, 823 (1962).
24 Ibid. See Karpman, op. cit. supra note 19, at 478-85.
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Two thirds of the psychiatric authorities consulted by the writer
pointed to the wide disagreement among psychiatrists as to the
meaning of the term, "sex psychopath." More than half of them
maintained that this condition is not a sufficiently clear diagnostic
entity to justify legislation concerning the type. . .. The
statutory definitions by which the several jurisdictions have
attempted to define the coverage of their psychopath laws have
in fact made even more vague what was already quite unclear
concerning the sorts of cases that were designed to be included
*. The descriptive clauses in the enactments leave much to be
desired either from the point of view of medical diagnosis or
court application.
Insanity and feeble-mindedness are generally excluded by the
terms of the laws, but there remains a virtually unlimited area
of psychological variability that can be interpreted to come within
their intended scope. The concepts employed to define the psycho-
path, such as mental disorder, mental illness, mental disease, emo-
tional instability, impulsiveness in behavior, and other similar
qualities are far from specific in their meaning. This is particularly
true if psychological deviation is viewed as a relative matter, with
wide gradation from normal to abnormal, and with a majority of
men somewhere in between. The more functional terms applied in
some of the laws, suggesting a "propensity" to sex crimes, or lack
of customary standards of good judgment have very little utility
for distinguishing the psychopath or the abnormal sex offender
from other sexual deviates. Such expressions could easily be ap-
plied to sex offenders who are non-pathological in psychological
orientation 2 r
Since the psychiatrist is given no adequate medical standards
to use as a measuring device, he must look elsewhere for a basis for
his decision as to whether he thinks this individual constitutes a
danger to society and consequently should not be permitted to
remain at large. But such criteria are not medical in nature and
consequently the psychiatrist has no special expertise to determine
the question. Yet who can question but that his recommendation
will be largely dispositive of the issue? The result is that funda-
mentally social-legal determinations are made by the psychiatrist as
a medical expert.
The statutory definitions are not based solely on the desire
to utilize medical knowledge. Nonmedical factors such as the desire
to protect society from repeated sexual misconduct have also played
a role. Still, there seems to be no justification for defining those
persons who may be subject to sex-psychopath proceedings in such
25 Tappan, "Some Myths About the Sex Offender," 19 Fed. Prob. 7, 10 (June
1955).
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vague terms.2 The need for a clear definition becomes apparent
when the consequences of a finding of sexual psychopathy are con-
sidered-an indefinite commitment to a state mental institution.
Further, such a finding is not often something the particular indi-
vidual seeks, it is thrust upon him involuntarily.27
PROCEDURES UNDER THE SEX-PSYCHOPATH STATUTES
The sex-psychopath statutes may be divided into two groups:
those which may be applied before an individual is convicted of
a crime (pre-conviction statutes) and those which can be applied
only after the defendant is convicted of a criminal offense (post-
conviction statutes) .28 Presently thirteen jurisdictions have pre-
conviction statutes.29 Since 1950, however, most states enacting
such legislation have adopted the post-conviction form of statutef80
The exceptions to this trend are Florida and Iowa, as well as Ala-
bama, which in 1961 converted its statute to the pre-conviction
form.f3
Procedures under Pre-conviction Statutes
Eight of the thirteen jurisdictions having pre-conviction stat-
utes require that the offender have been charged with some criminal
offense in order for the sex-psychopath procedures to be invoked.
3 2
Only two of these eight states, Alabama and Washington, require
that the offense charged be sexual in nature. The five remaining
jurisdictions do not require that any criminal charge be pending,
26 One of the criticisms of the sex-psychopath statutes is that they are so
broad that usually only the minor offender falls prey to them. See Ploscowe, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 229.
27 Compare the defense of insanity which the defendant must affirmatively prove.
See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962), holding that the lower District of
Columbia court erred in forcing the defense of insanity on the accused when he did
not seek it.
28 For a fairly recent survey of the various statutes and their procedures see
Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 18, at 319-26; Swanson, "Sexual Psychopath
Statutes: Summary and Analysis," 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 215, 228-35 (1961).
29 Ala. Code tit. 15, § 436 (Supp. 1964) ; Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 5600;
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917.12 (Supp. 1964); 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-3 (Smith-Hurd
1964) ; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3403 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.2 (Supp. 1964);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.967(3) (1954); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 526.10 (1947); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 202.710 (1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Supp. 1963); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 173:3 (1964); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.06.020 (1962); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 22-3504 (1961).
30 Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 18, at 300.
81 See appropriate statutory citations supra note 29.
82 The states are Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri,
and Washington. See appropriate statutes suPra note 29.
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demanding only a showing of probable cause to invoke the pro-
cedures. 3
The proceedings are initiated by filing a petition or statement
in the appropriate court. This is usually done at the discretion of
the state's attorney,34 although some statutes permit the defend-
ant t5 or some reputable third party 6 to initiate the action when
there is "reason to believe" the individual is a sexual psychopath."
The initiation of these procedures usually stays any pending criminal
charges.38 The contents of the petition will vary somewhat depend-
ing on the particular statute of the jurisdiction. However, facts
showing the basis for the belief that the individual is a sexual
psychopath must be alleged. A petition that set forth no facts but
merely alleged the conclusion that the individual was a sexual
psychopath has been held defective to the extent that the entire
proceedings were declared invalid. 9
The next step in the proceedings is a medical examination by
two or more psychiatrists or physicians before a hearing is held. The
qualifications required of the examiners vary from merely being a
licensed medical doctor4" to being a psychiatrist with five years
experience.41 Three states by statute require the defendant to answer
the medical examiner's questions or face contempt, and a number
of jurisdictions have ruled that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is not available in these proceedings.4 Some of the states re-
33 See the California, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and District of
Columbia statutes, supra note 29.
34 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3504 (1961).
35 See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3403 (1956). In Indiana if the prosecution seeks
application of the statute the court must conduct the inquiry, but if the defendant
seeks such action it becomes a matter of discretion with the court and the court's
refusal to conduct such a procedure is not error unless it is an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Criminal Court, 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E2d 128 (1955). In that case the court
held that the refusal to conduct a hearing concerning sexual psychopathy was not an
abuse of discretion even though defendant made out a prima facie case.
36 See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 225A2 (Supp. 1964).
37 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 15, § 436 (Supp. 1963).
38 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3510 (1961).
39 People v. Artinian, 320 Mich. 441, 31 N.W.2d 688 (1948). See In re Carter,
337 Mich. 496, 60 N.W2d 433 (1953), in which the court held that a petition which
stated the defendant had been accused of sex crimes in the past but never convicted
was insufficient.
40 Minn. Stat. § 526.10 (1961).
41 Mich. Stat. Ann § 28.967(4) (1954).
42 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3506 (1961); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3404 (Supp. 1965);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.967(4) (1954). For a general discussion of the privilege against
self-incrimination as it relates to these procedures, see Mihn, "A Re-examination of
the Validity of Our Sex Psychopath Statutes in the Light of Recent Appeal Cases
and Experience," 44 J. Crim. L, C. & P.S. 716, 728-30 (1954).
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quire that all of the examiners concur in a finding that the defendant
probably is a sexual psychopath before a hearing may be held.43
Once the examiner's report is filed showing there is cause to
believe the defendant is a sexual psychopath, a hearing is held. The
defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel and some states
specifically provide that the court must appoint counsel if the
accused cannot hire his own.44 The statutes often provide that a
broad range of evidence relating to prior sexual misconduct will be
admissible at the hearing, including either reports of the medical
examiners or, more often, the testimony of the medical examiners
themselves.4 5
If the accused is found to be a sexual psychopath he is com-
mitted for an indefinite period to an appropriate institution.46
Generally the statutes provide that throughout this commitment
periodic examinations of the individual must be made and a report
thereof given to the appropriate authority, i.e., the committing
court.
4 7
When the individual has improved to the extent he is no longer
considered dangerous or has fully recovered, release proceedings may
be instituted through the committing court or a parole board in
accordance with the statutory provisions. The release may be final,
or some sort of parole may be imposed.43 Habeas corpus has been
43 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 15, § 437 (Supp. 1963). By comparison New Hampshire
requires only an majority of these examiners to find the individual is a sexual
psychopath. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173:5 (1964).
44 Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 18, at 301, list only three states,
Iowa, Minnesota, and Nebraska, that provided by statute for the appointment of
counsel in 1961. Since then California, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia
have made provision for the appointment of counsel. Quaere whether Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), should impose a similar duty on the other states. La-
Morre v. Superintendent, 199 N.E2d 204 (Mass. 1964), took the position that since
such proceedings are not penal in nature the right to counsel under Gideon does not
apply, but the soundness of this approach is open to challenge in light of the result of
a finding of sexual psychopathy. See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 950 (1963).
45 See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-5 (1964); Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.10
(Supp. 1964) ; see also Swanson, supra note 28, at 224 n.75.
46 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. §§ 22-3508, 22-3509 (1961). Iowa gives the court
discretion to commit or have the accused stand trial on the original criminal charge.
Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.11 (Supp. 1964). For an argument that there should be
more use of outpatient treatment in cases of sexual psychopathy, see Furia & Mees,
"Dangerous to be at Large-A Constructive Critique of Washington's Sexual
Psychopath Laws," 38 Wash. L. Rev. 531 (1963).
47 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173:7 (1964).
48 For a comparison of release procedures and a discussion thereof see Swanson,
supra note 28, at 218-19, 228-35. Tappan has argued that one of the big problems with
the statutes is that of standards for release. Psychiatrists, fearing public reaction, are
reluctant to release "sex psychopaths" from custody. See Tappan, "Sentences for Sex
Criminals," 42 J. Crim, L. & Criminology 332, 335 (1951).
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held an appropriate remedy for those seeking release from sex-
psychopath commitment.49
New Hampshire has a specific provision that if the psychopath
has been in custody more than two years and has received the
maximum benefit from whatever treatment has been made avail-
able and there are more than thirty sexual psychopaths in custody,
then the individual psychopath may be transferred to the state
prison where he is to be segregated from the other prisoners.50 This
presents an interesting question as to just how much importance
should be attached to the contention that treatment of the in-
dividual is one of the major purposes of these statutes.
Finally, the states divide on the effect of the finding of sexual
psychopathy pending criminal charges. Three states provide that
such a finding precludes trial on any original charge."1 The position
of California and Nebraska is unclear. The remaining states specif-
ically provide that such a finding is not a defense, and that the
sex-psychopath procedures are not to change the insanity test for
criminal responsibility.5 2
Procedures under Post-conviction Statutes
The post-conviction statute cannot be brought into operation
until the defendant has been convicted of some crime, usually
sexual in nature . 3 In discussing procedures under these statutes
it should be remembered that they and the pre-conviction statutes
are not mutually exclusive in relation to the time at which they
may be invoked in a criminal proceeding. Generally the pre-convic-
tion statutes, although applicable prior to conviction may be in-
stituted at any time up to sentencing. Thus either type of statute
may be applied following a conviction, the distinction being that
the post-conviction statutes may be applied only at that time.
Under the post-conviction statutes the procedures may be
instituted by the court either on its own motion, 4 on motion of
For an analysis of actual application of release procedures in Nebraska implying
that the one necessary element is some third party trying to obtain the prisoner's
release see Comment, supra note 11.
49 See Mihrn, supra note 42, at 725.
5o N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173 :11a (1964). A similar practice without any such
statute was disapproved in Michigan. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W2d 470
(1958).
51 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-9 (Smith-Hurd 1964) ; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3409
(1956) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.967(8) (1954).
52 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3511 (1961) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.13 (Supp.
1964).
53 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat- Ann. § 17-244 (1960); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:164-3
(Supp. 1964).
5 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 1166 (1964).
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the state's attorney, 55 or at the request of a representative of the
defendant.55 Some states, however, vest no discretion in the court
but make the proceedings mandatory upon conviction of certain
offenses.5 7 The next step is the psychiatric examination, and as in
the case of the pre-conviction statutes, there is a wide variance in
the qualifications required of the examiners. When the report of
the examiners is received, the court in most cases makes a decision
without a separate hearing on the specific issue of sexual psycho-
pathy.58 Massachusetts, 9 Maryland,"0 and Ohio " do provide a sepa-
rate hearing and the procedure followed is similar to that used in the
pre-conviction jurisdictions, including provision for counsel and
broad rules of admissibility.
A number of states specifically permit the court to place the
defendant on probation on condition he receive outpatient treat-
ment if the court feels this approach will be satisfactory. 2 The
advantage to this provision is readily apparent. It gives the court
greater flexibility in dealing with offenders and permits some dis-
tinction between the treatment imposed on the minor offender and
that required for one that might be classified as truly dangerous.
When probation is not available or not used in a particular
case, then, as in the pre-conviction statutes, most of the post-
conviction statutes call for the defendant to be sentenced to an in-
determinate term, up to life, in an appropriate institution.63
Connecticut,64 New Jersey, 5 West Virginia,"' Wisconsin, 7 and
Wyoming 8o limit the sentence to the maximum penal sanction that
could have been imposed for the offense of which defendant was
convicted. The requirements for parole or release are generally the
same as those under the pre-conviction statutes.69
55 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 2813 (1957).
56 Va. Code Ann. § 53-2782 (1950).
57 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-1303 (Supp. 1964).
58 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-19-1 to 39-19-10 (1963).
59 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123A, § 5 (1965).
60 Md. Ann. Code art. 31B, § 8A (Supp. 1964).
81 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.25 (Page 1953).
62 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-19-5 (1963) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-245
(1960); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123A, § 5 (1965); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:164-6
(1953) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 2666(6) (1961).
63 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-19-1 (1963).
64 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-245 (1960).
65 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:164-6 (1953).
68 W. Va. Code Ann. § 2666(12) (1961).
67 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 959.15(12) (1958).
68 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-356 (Supp. 1963).
e0 See Lindman & McIntyre, -The Mentally Disabled and the Law 302, 319-26
(1961) ; Swanson, supra note 28, at 228-35.
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Under the post-conviction statutes it is possible that the de-
fendant would be deemed ready for release before the sentence
provided for by the criminal statutes had run. If the indefinite
commitment were considered to be in lieu of the usual sentence
this would present no problem, and a complete release would be
possible. The criminal sentence is a factor in many instances, how-
ever. Some of the states handle this problem by providing for
parole under close supervision up to the maximum criminal sentence
expiration date and then release the individual outright.
70
Ohio's approach is somewhat different. At the original sentenc-
ing the defendant is given two sentences: the one specified by the
penal statutes, and an indefinite sentence under the psychopath
law. 71 If he recovers before the period provided by the penal statutes
has expired, the indefinite commitment is terminated, and the
criminal sentence is instituted, with the time served under the
indefinite commitment being credited as time served under the
criminal sentence.72 The parole board then determines whether the
defendant will be paroled or required to serve the remainder of his
sentence.
The Massachusetts sex-psychopath statute has a provision
that permits prisoners already serving a sentence for some criminal
offense to be transferred after a hearing to an appropriate institu-
tion as a sexually dangerous person, and there to be kept in-
definitely.73 Two recent decisions reveal the potentialities of this
particular provision. In LaMorre v. Suzperintendent,74 the defendant
in 1959 entered a guilty plea to charge of indecent assault and
battery, and open and gross lewdness. He was sentenced to two
and a half to three years in a correctional institution. A petition
filed by the District Attorney at that time to have sexual psycho-
pathy proceedings instituted was denied. Thirty days before de-
fendant was due to be released sexual psychopathy proceedings
were instituted against him and sixty days later he was determined
a sexually dangerous person, and committed for an indefinite period.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained the finding
saying that the fact that he was not a prisoner at the time of the
final determination and that he was not represented by counsel at
the early stages of the proceeding did not invalidate the commit-
70 See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-356 (Supp. 1963).
71 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 294725 (Page 1953).
72 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 294727(A) (Page 1953).
73 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123A, § 6 (1965). The Massachusetts court has
held the section constitutional in Commonwealth v. Ackers, 175 N.E2d 677 (Mass.
1961). But see People v. Frontezak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938), striking
down a similar provision.
74 199 NE2d 204 (Mass. 1964).
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ment. In Commonwealth v. Peterson,75 proceedings were instituted
against the defendant while he was serving a sentence for assault
with a dangerous weapon on a police officer. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court sustained a finding that defendant was a
sexually dangerous person, finding no violation of due process even
though defendant was not serving a sentence for a sexual offense,
had no record of having been convicted for any sexual offense, no
evidence of sexual misconduct while in prison was introduced, and
the psychiatrist's definition of sexually dangerous person did not
conform with the statutory definition.
Constitutionality of the Procedures
Even a cursory examination of the procedures outlined above
reveals that the problem of protecting the rights of the individuals
involved is a real one. Not only are the statutory protections
minimal, but there is also the problem of giving real substance to
the few protections that are present. Frequently the courts have
side-stepped challenges based on the constitutional rights of de-
fendants in criminal actions by holding these procedures are civil
rather than criminal in nature.76 Yet it is clear that the impact
of these statutes on an individual equals anything a criminal statute
could muster and consequently the need for protecting the rights
of the individual is as great.77 The Supreme Court has declared
that such procedures are not invalid on their face, but might be
unconstitutional as applied.78
VALIDITY OF POLICIES UNDERLYING THE LAWS
In evaluating the purposes of the sex-psychopath statutes and
the validity of the assumptions underlying them, certain factors
must be kept in mind. First, all states have purely civil commitment
procedures applicable to mentally ill persons who might constitute
a danger to themselves or others.79 Why the special treatment of
the sex psychopath with its heavy criminal sanctions? Further,
as the discussion above indicates, there is no valid medical reason
75 205 N.E2d 719 (Mass. 1965).
76 Cf. Wilson v. State, 236 Ind. 278, 139 N.E2d 554 (1957); People v. Chap-
man, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942). But cf. Minnesota v. Probate Court 309 U.S.
270 (1939). See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R2d 350 (1952).
77 See Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 69, at 302-03; Mihm, .mpra note
42; Swanson, "Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis," 51 J. Crim.
L., C. & P.S. 215 (1960).
78 Minnesota v. Probate Court, supra note 76.
79 For a survey of involuntary commitment procedures in the various states
see Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 69, at 15-106.
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to put sex offenders in a separate class, since their actions are
symptomatic of a myriad of mental diseases. Finally, it is generally
conceded that the element of deterrence is not a factor in punish-
ment when the "sex psychopath" is involved.80
The question then becomes, why a special procedure for this
group? Is there a rational basis for attempting to accomplish
whatever the purposes of the statutes may be by these procedures,
as opposed to the existing criminal and civil commitment pro-
cedures? What caused the comparatively rapid adoption of these
statutes in thirty-one jurisdictions in less than thirty years?
The statutes themselves set forth the ostensible motivations
for their passage:
Sex offenders constitute a species of mentally ill persons in the
eyes of the general assembly, and where this tendency is pro-
nounced, they should have the same care and custody as mentally
ill persons generally, and such persons should be given continued
care and treatment so long as their release would constitute a
threat to them or to the general public.8 '
Another statute declares:
that the frequency of sex crimes within this state necessitates
that appropriate measures be adopted to protect society more
adequately from aggressive sexual offenders; that the laws
of this state do not provide for the proper disposition of those
who commit or have a tendency to commit such crimes and whose
actions result from a psychopathic condition; that society as
well as the individual will benefit by a civil commitment which
would provide for indeterminate segregation and treatment of
such persons; that the necessity in the public interest for the
provisions hereinafter enacted is a matter of legislative determina-
tion.82
If the actual purposes of these statutes are the protection of society
and treatment of the individual, the question still remains what
factors render sexual misconduct appropriate for special considera-
tion as opposed, for example, to psychopathy evidenced by theft?
The Protection of Society
The need for protection of society assumes that there are a
sufficient number of sex offenders, real or potential, who constitute
a danger to the physical and mental well-being of the rest of society
to warrant the passage of this type of statute. Tappan, relying
inter alia on the Kinsey Reports, concludes that although there is
80 Karpman, The Sexual Offender and His Offenses 248-50, 486 (1954).
81 Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-1302 (Supp. 1964).
82 N.H. ReV. Stat. Ann. § 173:1 (1964).
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some sex deviation in the populace, "vicious sex murderers" are
rare. 3 Further, the criminal sanctions which can be imposed must
be kept in mind when evaluating the existence of a class of "sex
fiends." The truly dangerous offender is usually subjected to the
criminal sanction, and the minor offender is caught up in the sex-
psychopath procedures."
What, then, of the emotional impact on the victim? Is there
some basis here for these laws? There is no doubt that there is an
emotional trauma from such an experience, yet there appear to
be certain personality characteristics in some "victims" which
predisposes them to become victims.85 Further, much of the emo-
tional trauma is not so much the result of the act itself but of the
subsequent conduct of relatives and friends."' This does not mean
that the emotional effects should be totally ignored, but that the
actual impact in many instances would certainly be no greater than
that suffered because of an encounter with some other form of
criminal conduct, such as an armed robber. Why inm this instance
are our criminal sanctions deemed inadequate to protect society?
A strong possibility is the assumption that such offenders are
recidivists. Sutherland 87 and Tappan,.8  relying on a myriad of
statistical data, take the position that sex offenders have a very
low rate of recidivism. The statistical validity of this position has
been questioned on the grounds that only a minute percentage
of the minor sex offenses committed are punished, and those who
commit major offenses involving violence have little or no oppor-
tunity to repeat because of the extensive criminal sanctions
applied.8 9 In evaluating recidivism as a basis for justification of the
sex-psychopath laws, one must question whether the purpose of the
statute should be construed to be for the protection of society
from the minor offender, whose practices at worst constitute a
nuisance and bring no harm to others, or from the offender whose
conduct may bring injury or even death to others.
Another possible basis for the sex-psychopath statute is that
the minor offender is more likely to progress to more serious crimes
83 Tappan, "Some Myths About the Sex Offender," 19 Fed. Prob. 7 (June 1955).
See also Sutherland, "The Sexual Psychopath Laws," 40 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
543, 544-46 (1950).
84 Ploscowe, Sex and the Law 229 (1951).
85 See Halleck, "Emotional Effects of Victimization," in Sexual Behavior and
the Law 673 (Slovenko ed. 1965).
86 See Tappan, supra note 83, at 8. For a study of a group of child victims of
sex offenses see Bowman, Sexual Deviation Research 45-66 (1952).
87 Sutherland, supra note 83, at 547.
88 Tappan, supra note 83, at 8-9.
89 See Bowman & Engle, "Sexual Psychopath Laws," in Sexuil Behavior and
the Law 757, 762-63, 769-70 (Slovenko ed. 1965).
[VoL 26
COMMENT
and should be prevented from doing so. The consensus seems to be
that this is not the case, that the minor offender is no more likely
to commit a violent sexual act than any other person.90 Therefore,
there would still be validity in subjecting the minor offenders to
at least the beginnings of the sex-psychopath procedures if there
were some basis for selecting those particular few who promised
to become dangerous in the future. Apparently medical knowledge
has not yet progressed to a point where such a selection can be
made with any degree of accuracy.91 Thus the concept of progres-
sion provides no basis for these special procedures.
In summary, none of the possible bases for the concept of the
protection of society is sufficient, in this author's opinion, to warrant
the selection of the sexual psychopath for special treatment under
procedures distinct from the usual criminal or civil commitment
procedures. If society does not need special protection from this
class, then we are left with the paternalistic view that these persons
require medical treatment, and only through civil process can treat-
ment be effectively administered . 2
Treatment of the Individual
If treatment is the basic rationale, our methods must be effec-
tive or we have no grounds for applying the statutes. Extreme
methods such as castration or electroshock therapy have not met
with general approval or shown themselves to be effective.93 Psycho-
therapy on the other hand has shown some encouraging results,
but it is generally conceded that medical knowledge at present is
inadequate to determine the extent to which this mode of treatment
will prove successful. 4 Thus it would seem that at present there is
still much work to be done in devising effective methods of
treatment.
Assuming, however, that methods of treatment are known,
these methods must be applied to the psychopath to justify holding
him under the sex-psychopath laws. In reality, commitment to a
state institution appears to afford the individual little hope of
treatment; rather he is merely kept in custody at the institution.9
00 See Tappan, supra note 83, at 9.
91 See Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 69, at 306; Tappan, supra note
83, at 9-10.
92 Bowman & Engle, supra note 89, at 768.
93 See, e.g., Karpman, op. cit. supra note 80, at 614-15.
94 Id. at 615. But see Bowman & Engle, supra note 89, at 768-69; Comment, 36
Neb. L. Rev. 320, 342 (1957), which questions whether the psychopathic personality
can really be cured by psychotherapy. If the latter position is correct, quaere
whether psychotherapy is really treatment or a means of separating those likely to
repeat their conduct from those who in all probability will not.
95 See Lindman & McIntyre, op. cit. supra note 69, at 306-08; Ploscowe, op.
cit. supra note 84, at 235; Tappan, supra note 83, at 11.
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The primary reason for this, not considering the lack of effective
methods of treatment, is the failure of the states to provide ade-
quate funds, staff, and facilities to perform the necessary thera-
peutic functions. 6
The lack of treatment is a basic condemnation of the sex deviate
laws, since the philosophy behind such legislation is that these
offenders should be treated rather than punished. Lack of treat-
ment destroys any otherwise valid reason for differential con-
sideration of the sexual psychopath. It would appear that the law
is looking to medical knowledge for solutions to problems in this
area only to find that such knowledge is as yet non-existent or
imprecise.97
It appears, then, that at present there is no valid basis, either
in terms of protection of society, or treatment of the offender, for
the special procedures provided by the sex-psychopath statutes in
light of the already existing criminal and civil commitment pro-
cedures. What, then, caused the comparatively rapid adoption of
this type of statute in so many jurisdictions? Professor Tappan has
suggested:
In the face of the patent fallacies used to support indefinite
treatment of the sex deviate, is it not apparent that in reality
other motives have guided most of the recent legislation? Per-
haps the anxiety and guilt feelings that are associated with sex in
the American mentality? Invidious treatment by open-ended
sentences reflects our underlying need to punish the sex deviate
more severely than other criminals. Our wishful thinking about
therapy is a seemingly benevolent rationalization to cover fear and
hate. It has been supported by the unfortunate notion that con-
temporary psychiatry possesses some mysterious omnicompetence
in resolving behavior problems, a myth that reputable authorities
in that field are at pains to destroy. Unhappily they have not been
so audible in regard to the sex offender problem as certain rabid
journalists have.98
This may help to explain why so many courts seem uneasy about
applying these statutes. With a few notable exceptions, such as
California, Michigan, and Wisconsin, the statutes are not widely
use."9 The courts, cognizant of the potential lifetime in custody
98 Lindman & McIntyre, op cit. supra note 69, at 307.
97 Id. at 307-08.
9s Tappan, "Sentences for Sex Criminals," 42 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 332,
335-36 (1951); Levy, "Interaction of Institutions and Policy Groups: The Origin of
Sex Crime Legislation," 5 Law. & L. Notes 3 (1951), describes the role of the
press, law enforcement agencies, and civic groups in creating the impression of a
sex crime wave where in fact there was none and then discusses the forces behind
the passage of this legislation.
99 See Bowman & Engle, supra note 89, at 761-62.
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and the lack of medical knowledge and treatment facilities, seek
other means of dealing with the sex offender, especially when the
offense is a minor one.
CONCLUSION
There is no valid basis for identifying the sex offender as a
class for special procedures beyond the criminal sanctions and civil
commitment currently available. The application of the sex-psycho-
path statutes and the resulting indefinite commitment are penal
in nature, notwithstanding judicial and legislative protestation to
the contrary.
Yet there are some authorities who argue that while there is
no basis for a different approach to the treatment afforded the sex
offender at the hands of the law, in fact, most criminal conduct is
the product of some mental disease and the concept of the indefinite
sentence coupled with treatment aimed at rehabilitation actually
represents a progressive approach to the handling of all criminal
sanctions. 00 This idea presupposes a far more advanced knowledge
of the human mind than today exists, and has all the problems
concerning funds, facilities, and staff for treatment that are pres-
ently found in the sex-psychopath area. Further, this approach
results in turning over to the psychiatrist the question of the
extent of any sanction imposed and this would represent a funda-
mental change in the basic concepts of the criminal law, especially
in relation to the questions of who has the duty of determining
the existence of criminal responsibility and what the extent of that
responsibility shall be in a given case. Needless to say such an ap-
proach is by no means unanimously accepted as valid.101
Regardless of the merit of such an approach as an ideal
method, there is no doubt that at present, medical knowledge is
insufficient to warrant instituting such a program. What then is to
be done with the sex-psychopath statutes? If not repeal, then as a
minimum these steps are suggested:
First, the courts should recognize that the statutes are funda-
mentally penal in nature and then take the necessary steps to
protect the procedural rights of the accused. This would include
the right to counsel, the right to be free from self-incrimination,
and a separate hearing before a jury on the question of sexual
psychopathy.
Second, the statutes should all be of the post-conviction type,
limited to sex crimes of violence, or those involving children.
This is especially important in light of the medical inability to
100 See Tappan, supra note 98.
101 See, e.g., Bowman & Engle, .'upra note 89; Sutherland, supra note 83.
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predict future behavior and the invalidity of the concept that sex
offenders tend to progress to more serious sex offenses.
Third, the courts should have the option of placing those found
to be sexual psychopaths on probation subject to treatment as
outpatients at some approved institution. This would give the court
greater flexibility in the handling of these individuals than is
presently possible under the mandatory commitment provisions.
If commitment is appropriate it should be for a period not to
exceed the maximum possible sentence imposed by the penal
statutes for the crime of which the defendant stands convicted.
If at the end of that period it is felt that the commitment should
be continued, the state should be required to seek a new commit-
ment order for another limited period. There should be a full
hearing before the committing court with the defendant being
accorded all the usual substantive and procedural safeguards and
the state bearing the burden of proof.
Fourth, definite standards for release should be devised, based
on the proposition that the defendant should be released as soon as
he improves to the point where he no longer can be considered
likely to demonstrate antisocial conduct that is dangerous to others.
If the defendant reaches that stage of improvement before the
maximum sentence under the penal statutes has run, the remaining
time under that sentence should play no part in determining
whether the defendant will be released outright, or be subject to
supervision.
Finally, regardless of whether any of the above mentioned
changes are adopted, there should be a fundamental change in the
area of treatment. The states must offer more than mere custody
to those committed. Facilities and staff must be improved so that
those committed may have the treatment to which they are entitled.
Effective outpatient programs should be developed to afford con-
tinued help to those no longer considered dangerous.
Thomas M. Tyack
